Fix Tile operator DoS via unbounded repeats allocation#28070
Open
GopalakrishnanN wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
Open
Fix Tile operator DoS via unbounded repeats allocation#28070GopalakrishnanN wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
GopalakrishnanN wants to merge 1 commit intomainfrom
Conversation
Contributor
|
@GopalakrishnanN please read the following Contributor License Agreement(CLA). If you agree with the CLA, please reply with the following information.
Contributor License AgreementContribution License AgreementThis Contribution License Agreement (“Agreement”) is agreed to by the party signing below (“You”),
|
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Description
Add output size validation to the Tile CPU operator to prevent denial of service via attacker-controlled repeat values that lead to excessive memory allocation.
Root Cause
The Tile operator reads repeats from an attacker-supplied 1D int64 tensor and multiplies each input dimension by the corresponding repeat value. The only existing validation is a negative check and SafeInt overflow protection. There is no upper bound on the resulting output size, allowing a single inference call to request 16+ GB of memory and crash the server.
Fix
Testing
Motivation and Context
Security fix for a Denial of Service vulnerability in the Tile CPU operator where attacker-controlled repeats input can cause unbounded memory allocation.